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Introduction
Considering the archipelagic setting of the country, the domestic shipping
transport industry is one of the most important structural supports of the
economy. The industry provides the primary means of interisland transport.
That is, the bulk of domestic trade is transported by shipping; interisland
travel, especially in the Visayas and Mindanao, is also largely dependent on
shipping. Given this vital role, an efficient shipping industry, where passengers
and cargoes get to their destinations on time and in good and safe condition
at the least possible cost, is crucial to the economic growth of the economy.
The country’s domestic shipping industry, however, has been regarded
to be inefficient. This is rather unfortunate, as the industry has a large number
of shipping operators who expect competition to be a powerful force for
eliminating inefficiency. Past studies suggest the underlying explanation
has much to do with the regulations and policies of the government affecting
the industry.
The industry has been highly regulated until policy reforms were
instituted beginning in the 1990s in response to the continuing inefficiency.
The reforms came through the deregulation of the passage and freight rates
and the liberalization of route entry. This study examines the effects of these
policy reforms on competition and market structure.30 PHILIPPINE JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT
The scope of the paper is limited to the interisland liner shipping
industry, because this is the sector of the industry where regulation is highly
concentrated and whose viability is highly sensitive to government policy.1 In
addition, the study covers only shipping transport which refers to the actual
transportation service performed once the commodity or passenger is  on
board  a  ship  until  the  ship  reaches  its  port  of destination. Issues on other
shipping services, namely, auxiliary services (i.e., activities related to cargo
manipulation in ports and ships like cargo handling, storage and warehousing,
freight forwarding, etc.) and port services (i.e., activities related to ship
management in ports like pilotage, towing and tug assistance, navigation
aids, etc.) are therefore not included. These activities are confronted by
issues of their own.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses the
contestability of markets in the shipping industry, including the arguments
for and against regulating the industry. The succeeding section examines
the policy reforms made through liberalization and deregulation. The effects
of the reforms on market structure and competition, including the impact of
competition on efficiency, are then analyzed. This is followed by a discussion
on the role of the Maritime Industry Authority (MARINA) in a deregulated
and liberalized environment. Areas for competition policy and further reforms
are then identified. The summary and conclusions are presented in the last
section.
Contestability of markets in the shipping industry
The literature on contestability of markets points to the importance of the
threat of competition, as distinct from actual competition, in enforcing good
behavior and conduct among firms in the industry (Hanlon 1996). This kind
of market is characterized by the following: (a) there are no barriers to entry
(i.e., no extra cost borne by new entrants that are not borne by the incumbents;
(b) there are no sunk costs (i.e., costs that cannot be recouped when a firm
withdraws from the industry); (c) the time it takes for the incumbents to
change their price in response to the entry is longer than the length of time
it takes for a new entrant to make profits. According to this theory, firms in
oligopolistic industries will still price at the same level as they would in a
perfectly competitive market so long as the threat of competition exists. In
1“Liner shipping” refers to the operation of domestic water transportation that offers its
services to the public without discrimination, has regular ports of call and fixed sailing
schedules and frequency. The industry has two other sectors namely, (a) tramp shipping,
where freight vessels do not ply a regular route but are hierd on a contractual basis by
shippers under mutually agreed terms; and (b) industrial carriage, which is operated by
companies to cater to their own needs. Of the three sectors, only liner shipping is regulated
by the government.31
other words, under this market, the incumbents can protect themselves from
new competition only by behaving well.
A contestable market offers to consumers and the society similar benefits
from a perfectly competitive market (Baumol and Lee 1991). Because of the
threat of competition, firms cannot charge higher-than-competitive prices or
earn excessive profits; any attempt to do so would invite new entrants to
undercut the incumbents’ prices to a level that could still give them attractive
returns. Waste and inefficiency beyond what is allowed by the current state of
technology and level of knowledge are also avoided, as these would be
reflected in higher costs and prices, the presence of which would invite the
entry of efficient firms. Likewise, predatory pricing and cross-subsidy pricing
are prevented. Predation becomes unattractive, since it can only be done if
there is a prospect for making future profits large enough to recoup losses
made when prices or profits are kept low to drive competitors or new entrants
away; but then excessive profits would invite entry. Cross-subsidy occurs when
a firm charges a price below cost to particular groups of customers and the
loss is made up for by charging excessive prices to other customers. This is
not feasible under a contestable market, as the excessive price would invite
new entrants who can sell at a lower price level. In effect, the new entrants are
capturing from the incumbents the earnings that were previously used for
cross-subsidy.
Arguments for and against regulating the shipping industry
The shipping industry is a highly contestable market in the absence of
government regulations. The common argument for the need to regulate
liner shipping is based on the supposed danger of chronic instability due to
inherent tendencies to ruinous competition and monopoly (Renardet Sauti
Consulting Engineers 1986). That is, the industry is highly vulnerable to
price and capacity fluctuations, which lead to ruinous competition and
eventually to monopoly, after the weak firms are driven out.
Price instability
Vulnerability to price and capacity fluctuations, if there are no limits to
competition, is argued to be associated with the cost structure of the industry.
Once a vessel is at berth, the only cost associated with carrying an extra ton of
cargo is the cost of loading and discharging it; and such marginal cost is very
low, an average of 25 to 30 percent of the freight rate. At such rate, an operator
cannot survive. Hence, an operator will find it profitable to take an extra
cargo at a rate higher than the handling cost. However, if there is free
competition, the rate would be forced to go down to the level of the handling
cost whenever there is any surplus in capacity. The industry will then become
unprofitable for all operators.
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However, the above argument does not seem plausible, as shipping
operators do not cut their rates to the level of marginal costs once the ship is
at berth. Instead, what influences the behavior of operators is not the marginal
cost of an extra ton of cargo, but the cost of an extra voyage or set of voyages
and their relation to revenues at pre-determined rates.
Nevertheless, price-cutting is practiced only to the extent that there is
overcapacity or overtonnaging in the industry. This practice can lead to rate
instability.
Monopoly
Another argument for government regulation is the danger of monopoly. A
natural monopoly occurs when economies of scale allow a large company to
charge lower prices because its unit costs are lower than those of a small
company. This will eventually drive small firms from the market. In shipping,
the lower unit costs may arise from larger ships or from a larger number of
ships.
It is argued, however, that there are no significant economies of scale in
the shipping industry (Renardet Sauti Consulting Engineers 1986), or that
they are not a significant barrier to entry in the industry (Dick 1987). While
a larger vessel will generally give lower costs per ton than a small ship, the cost
advantage of larger vessels is offset by two factors. One, cargo-handling rates
increase less than proportionately with ship size, so that the larger ship tends
to spend a larger proportion of its time in port. Two, smaller ships are able to
provide more frequent service because of their faster turnaround. Hence,
small ships can operate alongside larger ships.
As far as fleet size is concerned, a large fleet will not necessarily have
lower costs per ton than a small fleet. More than 80 percent of a shipping
company’s operating costs are ship operating costs, the rest being terminal
and administrative ones. Thus, if a company increases its fleet by 20 percent,
its operating cost is expected to increase by the same amount (Renardet
Sauti Consulting Engineers 1986).
Furthermore, economies of size appear to be insignificant beyond about
three ships, while diseconomies seem to occur beyond about 10 ships (Dick
1987). This is attributed to managerial diseconomies of scale. Shipping
companies are said to be difficult to manage because the locations of the
head office, branch office, and terminals are so dispersed. Profitability is
highly dependent on capacity utilization, which in turn depends on port
turnaround. This would then require some kind of loyalty to the shipping
company of officers and crew to cooperate in speeding up turnaround. As a
general rule, however, officers and crew prefer a longer to a shorter stay in
port. Hence, to increase turnaround and productivity, some kind of incentive
and a good wage structure is required. The practice of family-owned shipping
businesses is to appoint family members to man the day-to-day operations of33
the business across various ports. However, as the number of ships, routes,
and ports increases, the problem of control and management seems to
increase disproportionately.
Competition in shipping
Rate discounting, particularly on freight rates, is a common practice in the
industry. Even when there are government regulations on rate setting, the
official rates become just a benchmark or a base from which to discount.
Actual freight rates are usually the product of bargaining between shippers
and shipping operators (Dick 1987). Discount comes in various forms like
under-recording the weight or volume of the cargo, or declaring the cargo as
a low-value item. Since such practices do not involve a reduction in freight
rate, as reflected in the bill of lading, shipping companies can make it appear
that they are following the official rates.
Discounting drives up price competition in the industry. To lessen the
pressure for rate discounts, shipping companies with established financial
position offer longer-term payments. On the other hand, forwarders, traders,
and large companies that distribute their own products can make bargains
for large discounts by offering a contract for their cargoes for a fixed period.
Guaranteed by the security of a contract and a large volume of cargoes, a
shipping company can thus settle for a low margin for its shipping rates.
The disadvantage of competing through rate discounting, however, is
that any discount can readily be matched by competitors. Thus, in the face of
intense rate competition, the best strategy for a shipping company is to
become the market leader in terms of quality of service. In practice, freight
rates are not the primary but the balancing item in the services negotiated
with shippers, as shippers and traders are more concerned with the safety of
their cargoes. That is, the cost of a late or damaged cargo could be much
more than the savings from a small discount in freight rate.
Thus, competition in shipping is primarily in terms of quality of service.
A good reputation for reliable service can insulate shipping companies from
intense competition in freight rates and allows them to charge a premium
rate and earn a more-than-normal profit. But charging a premium rate does
not provide a long-term guarantee against competition, as it encourages other
companies to improve the quality of their service and hence their
competitiveness. However, in times of excess capacity when rate-cutting is
prevalent, companies with good reputation are able to keep their share of
the market while companies offering not-so-reliable service destroy each other
in a fight for the crumbs. In practice, rate-cutting is prevalent only among
firms at the lower end of the market offering the poorest service and struggling
to survive.
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Liberalization and deregulation2
Regulation has a long history in the country’s shipping industry. It covers
route entry and rate determination. Regulation for liner rates began in 1928
to protect the public from indiscriminate charging by shipping companies
and to protect the investment of liner operators by preventing ruinous
competition. On the other hand, regulation for route entry was introduced
in 1972, with the objective to bring capacity and demand into balance. At that
time, the major routes were overtonnaged while many of the other routes
were either inadequately served or not at all (Nathan Associates 1991).
The government fixed the rates, or what are commonly called tariffs.
Prior to the policy reforms, the basic structure of tariffs remained largely
unchanged (Renardet Sauti Consulting Engineers 1986). Likewise, the
revenue deficiency method used in the upward adjustment of rates guaranteed
operators of earning profits, regardless of their performance.3 Thus, even
inefficient firms, which would normally be driven out of the industry if market
forces were allowed to operate, earned profits. Worse, the method made the
level of rates too high over the years. Although the government fixed the
rates, enforcement was weak. With rates too high and enforcement weak,
discounting became the rule (Nathan Associates 1991).
On the other hand, there was a deliberate policy, throughout the pre-
reform period, of limiting competition by restricting entry. This was
implemented through the “grandfather rules” in the granting of license to
operate, namely, prior operator, prior applicant, and protection of investment.
In general, these rules imply that if the demand warrants additional fleet in
a route, priority is given to the existing operator to put in the additional
vessel to meet the demand; but if there are several existing operators in the
route, priority is given to the first applicant. If there is no existing operator in
a route, entry is allowed and the new entrant is protected in his investment by
not allowing another operator until he has recovered his investment. Under
the three rules, however, the past service records of the operator/s or the new
applicant/s were not taken into consideration.
The past industry regulations had adverse impact on the industry and
the economy. These are well documented in such studies as the Interisland
Shipping Regulation Study prepared by the Renardet Sauti Consulting
2Austria (2002) includes a more detailed discussion of the regulatory framework and policies
during the pre-reform period and their consequent impacts on the growth of the industry and
the economy.
3Under the revenue deficiency method, the revenue required to provide a rate of return (ROI)
consistent with the Public Services Act of 1936 (which is 12 percent) is compared to the
actual revenue generated, and the difference indicated the deficiency in rates. The method
does not consider average load factors and degree of efficiency of operations such that
even if load factors are low and vessel operation is inefficient, rate increases were approved
so long revenue was insufficient to obtain the prescribed ROI.35
Engineers in 1986; findings of the Presidential Task Force on Interisland
Shipping Industry in 1989; the Philippine Transport Sector Review in 1990;
and the studies prepared by Nathan Associates, Inc. on the Interisland Liner
Shipping Rate Rationalization Study in 1991 and the Liner Shipping Route
Study in 1994. In general, the studies show that the tariff structure suffered
from major flaws. First, the rate differentials between passenger or commodity
class did not reflect differences in the cost of providing the services for each
group; thus, resulting in the discrimination of some commodities and
particular routes in the provision of shipping services. Second, the commodity
classification was also problematic as rates for some commodities were set too
low, thus failing to ensure the availability of sufficient service at all times;
while rates for other commodities were set too high to permit them to bear
the charges. Third, application of a uniform-rate formula for all routes was
inappropriate, as it did not consider both cargo inflow imbalances and cargo
mixes.4 Finally, the passage rates were not permitted to keep pace with the
increasing cost of providing passenger services, making profitability in
passenger service difficult to achieve and resulted in the tendency to overload
and provide poor-quality service.
The adverse impacts of the flaws in the tariff structure and rate setting
have fallen disproportionately on the producers and traders of agricultural
commodities. The very low rates for these commodities have limited the
appropriate shipping services for them. In turn, the unavailability of sufficient
services inhibited the growth of interisland trade and agricultural
diversification; and resulted in high storage costs, commodity value losses
resulting from deterioration, and high charges from the alternative and
limited services of trampers and air transport.
Given the adverse impacts of the past regulatory system on the economy,
policy reforms were introduced through the deregulation of rates and the
liberalization of route entry. The change in policy was meant to introduce
and/or enhance the level of competition in terms of the rates charged and
the quality of service rendered; and to attract new shipping investments by
leveling the playing field for existing and new operators.
Deregulation of Liner Rates
A summary of the reforms for liner rates is shown in Table 1. Changes in
policies and regulations were first initiated in 1989 under Memorandum
Circular (MC) No. Early reforms included the (a) abolition of the charging
AUSTRIA
4The unit cost per ton of cargo increases as capacity utilization falls. High-capacity utulization
rate cannot be achieved if there are large imbalances in the inbound and outbound traffic.
Hence, rates for routes with a good balance of the traffic in the two directions will not be
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of ad valorem5 rates, although a 3/10 percent surcharge of the declared
value of the commodity was imposed, except for Basic commodities; (b)
reclassification of basic commodities to Class C (basic);6 and (c) deregulation
of the first- and second-class passage rates.7 For the latter, a minimum of 50
percent of vessel capacity should be allocated to third-class accommodation.
The deregulation allowed operators to determine the rates they should charge
for their services.
Further reforms were made in 1990 under MC No. 57. The 3/10 percent
surcharge was abolished; hence, all commodities were charged the
corresponding class rates. Freight rates for refrigerated cargoes, transit cargoes,
and livestock were also deregulated. A most welcome reform was the
introduction of the fork tariff system for the determination of freight and
passage rates.8 Under the system, rates are allowed to fluctuate between upper
and lower limits from a given reference or indicative rate, thereby providing
some flexibility in the determination of rates. For cargoes, the system provides
a mechanism for the shippers and shipping operators to negotiate the rates
within the band set by the government. The first fork tariff system had a lower
and upper limit of –5 percent and +5 percent of the reference rate,
respectively. This meant that a domestic shipping operator could increase
his freight rate of a given commodity or shipment up to a maximum of 5
percent and may deduct a maximum of 5 percent on the base rate.
In 1991 (MC No. 59), the reference rate for the fork tariff system was
increased by 12 percent for the passage rate and 8 percent for the freight
rate. In 1992 (MC No. 66), a 6 percent rollback on freight rates was adopted.
In addition, the lower and upper limit of the fork tariff system was increased
from +/-5 percent to +10/-15 percent. A mechanism for automatic fuel
adjustment whenever prices of fuel increased or decreased by at least 10
percent was also instituted.9
The early reforms, however, were unable to correct the problems
identified earlier. First, the flexibility provided by the fork tariff system was
very limited as the rates could not vary to the extent that operating costs
5As an alternative to class rates, operators had the option to charge an ad valorem rate on
any good valued at over P2,000 per ton. The rate was 0.5 percent in 1928, at which time, it
excluded almost all goods in the interisland trade. By the 1980s, however, the threshold
included most commodities.
6Basic commodities include rice, palay, corn, corngrits, fruits, vegetables, and livestock.
7First-class passenger rate was first deregulated in 1983.
8Only members of the Conference of Interisland Shipowners and Operators and all other
operators who have filed applications for rate increase by paying the corresponding fee
and issued the corresponding order are authorized to use the fork tariff system.
9Under the mechanism, however, shipping operators cannot unilaterally adjust their rates.
Instead, MARINA will automatically adjust the rates with the issuance of the appropriate
order increasing or decreasing the rates within five working days after the increase/
decrease of fuel price.37
varied with respect to routes, ship technology (especially with the introduction
of container service and roll-on roll-off, or RORO, service), quality of
packaging, and changes in cargo handling methods. Second, the compulsory
requirement to allocate 50 percent of passenger capacity to third-class
passengers made pure passenger vessel operation less viable. Third, the
reclassification of basic commodities to Class C (Basic) failed to correct the
insufficiency of appropriate liner service for these commodities. Finally, the
deregulation of the second- and first-class passenger service did not cause
movement of passengers from third to second class (Nathan and Associates
1991).
Hence, further deregulation was made toward the end of 1992 (MC No.
71), this time involving the freight rates for Class A and Class B cargoes. The
operators were, however, required to file their rates for Class A and Class B
and any changes thereafter with the MARINA. In 1993 (MC No. 80), Class C
(basic) was abolished and the commodities classified therein were reclassified
as Class C. Fruits and vegetables in ventilated containers were also
deregulated. For passage rates, vessels accredited by the Department of
Tourism (DOT) as serving tourist areas were exempted from the requirement
of allocating 50 percent of their total passenger capacity to third-class
passengers. Accordingly, their rates were deregulated. However, if the vessel
only had first-class and second-class passenger accommodation or where the
third-class passenger accommodation was less than 50 percent of the
passenger capacity, the second-class passage rate was regulated.
Further deregulation of freight rates was made in 1994 through
Executive Order No. 213, with implementing guidelines under MC No. 117
issued in 1996. All freight rates were deregulated, except for
noncontainerized basic commodities. However, for monopolized and
cartelized routes, passage and freight rates continue to be regulated. The
fork tariff system is still applied to all regulated rates, the upward adjustment
of which continues to follow the revenue deficiency method.
The implementation of deregulated freight rates, however, is another
matter, as operators were not allowed to determine on their own the rates
they will charge for their services. Instead, the Domestic Shipping
Consultative Councils (DOSCONs), composed of shippers/consumers,
operators and representatives from the government, was instituted to provide
a forum for consultations and negotiations for the implementation of the
deregulated rates or any upward adjustments of the rates. Hence, the
deregulation, as provided for in EO 214, only modified the process of fixing
cargo rates—a task previously exercised by the government through a
quasijudicial process.
The DOSCON, however, was abolished in late 1999 when the
implementing guidelines of EO 213 were revised under MC No. 153. Under
the revised guidelines, all an operator needs to do is to file a notice of adoption
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of deregulated rates with the MARINA, and when qualified, MARINA will
issue an order within 30 days upon receipt of the notice. The deregulated
freight and passage rates should remain in force for at least three months
before any upward adjustment is allowed.
Upward adjustments of deregulated rates can take effect 15 days after
the publication of the notice for increase filed with the MARINA in a daily
newspaper of national circulation and in one daily newspaper of regional
circulation in the port/s affected by the rate adjustment.
For regulated rates, upward adjustment is still based on the revenue
deficiency method. Under the new policy environment, the method is no
longer appropriate, as the financial statements of shipping companies include
their deregulated operations.
In general, the deregulation of the liner shipping rates has been a slow
process. It took the government more than 10 years to gradually deregulate
the liner rates. Yet, it was only in the year 2000 that government intervention
in rate setting was lessened. With deregulation, the shipping companies can
now consider the traffic imbalances and cargo mixes in setting the rates for
the routes they serve. Areas remain regulated and can be strategic areas for
modernizing the industry. For example, shipping companies can upgrade
their vessels and facilities and be accredited with DOT to qualify them in the
exemption from allocating 50 percent of their passenger capacity to third
class and enjoy deregulated rates. In addition, the exception of
noncontainerized basic commodities from deregulation should encourage
the use of other shipping technology in transporting these commodities,
like roll-on roll-off vessels.
Much is still desired, however. The rate for third-class passenger service,
for example, has yet to be deregulated.
Route liberalization
Route liberalization was first introduced in 1992. Two general principles are
observed for the issuance of a license. First, the interest of the public is
paramount. That is, the interest of the public shall prevail over the
“grandfather rules.” Second, the presumption of public need for a service is
deemed in favor of the applicant for a license while the burden of proving
that the proposed service is not needed shall be with oppositor/s who is/are
the current authorized operator/s.
Given these principles, routes were opened to entry to at least two
operators (MC No. 71 and MC No. 80 in 1992). Monopolized routes were
opened for entry to additional operators. Operators in developmental routes,
on the other hand, were accorded protection for their investment for a
maximum period of five years, after which, the route is open to entry to at
least one additional operator. This was in stark contrast to the past regulation,
where an operator in a developmental route is accorded protection of his41
investment for an indefinite period until he has recovered his investment.
This change in rule would definitely encourage the operator to increase his
efficiency to recover his investments before competition from additional
operators sets in. Entry of newly acquired vessels in routes already served by
existing franchised operators, including developmental routes, is also
deregulated provided that it will introduce innovative, technologically and
cost-effective shipping services, among others.
Operators are allowed to withdraw or suspend their operations after
notifying MARINA 15 days prior to the planned withdrawal or suspension
and after duly informing the public. An operator, however, forfeits his license
if he abandons, withdraws, or suspends his operation for four months without
notifying MARINA. Increase in capacity is also allowed through replacement
with a bigger vessel, introduction of additional vessels, and/or increase in
frequency of existing vessels. An operator can also change his routing pattern
through the omission of ports, addition of one or more ports, or the
introduction of an entirely new route provided, however, that the change is
not in conflict with the schedule and frequency of existing operators and
that no route is left unserved by the rerouting.
The initial liberalization efforts were further strengthened with the
issuance of Executive Order 185 in 1994 and its corresponding implementing
rules and regulations under MC 106 in 1995. In particular, all routes that
have been serviced by any operator for an aggregate period of at least five
years shall be open for entry to additional operators. Likewise, any operator
who pioneers in the provision of a certain technological level of shipping
service in a developmental route is allowed to charge market-accepted freight
and passage rates different from the fork rates. The adoption of such rates
after five years, however, is dependent on the evaluation of MARINA. In
addition, when a vessel is replaced to increase capacity, its license is revoked
to ensure that it will not be used anywhere else and, hence, will not result in
increased tonnage in the routes. Similarly, when capacity is increased through
the introduction of additional vessel that is chartered from a franchised
operator, the original franchise of the vessel is revoked. This policy was again
a big contrast to the past regulation where the license of a vessel replaced was
not revoked.
The implementing guidelines of EO 185 were revised under MC No.
161 in 2000, providing further dimension to the liberalization efforts. In
particular, the conditions or criteria under which possible protection could
be accorded to operators were specified. These include conditions for the
existence of ruinous competition and protection of investment of pioneering
operators. Only under the conditions specified should entry of additional
operators to a route be restricted. The conditions set therefore added greater
transparency to the rules of the game.
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Market Structure and Competition
The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), measured as the sum of the squares
of the market shares, is used as an indicator of market structure. It is compared
with the ratio 1/n, where n is the number of operators in the industry. The
higher the index relative to 1/n, the less competitive the industry is. The
inverse of the index gives the number of equal-size competitors that would
provide a degree of competition equivalent to that actually observed in the
market share data. Hence, it is used as a measure of the number of effective
competitors.
The aggregate indicator of market structure for the industry is based
on the primary and secondary routes only; tertiary routes were excluded in
the computation. Since the tertiary routes involve short travels and hence
more frequent trips, the total passengers and cargoes plying these routes
would be larger in number compared to the primary and secondary routes.
Moreover, since HHI is based on market shares, including them in the
computation would distort the picture.
However, the aggregate indicator of market structure may give very little
insight on the extent of market power in the different routes because the
interisland fleet is distributed across so many different routes. It is possible
that a small operator may capture a large market share in a particular route by
concentrating its fleet in that route while a large operator may not capture a
significant market share if it spreads its fleet across several routes. Thus, it is
important to also examine the market structure by routes. The routes are
classified based on the value of 1/HHI as shown in Table 2.
The study used secondary data and interviews of shipping operators to
analyze market structure and competition in the shipping industry. Secondary
data on passenger and cargo traffic by route and shipping company were
gathered using the 1998 annual traffic reports of shipping companies
submitted to the MARINA. This is the latest set of data that are available and
complete. Much as the study would like to include early years to represent
the pre-reform period so that an analysis on whether or not the policy reforms
had made an impact on the market structure could be made, the annual
reports of shipping companies were not complete.10 Hence, to get a sense of
the impact of the reforms in the absence of data, interviews were made with
four shipping lines based in Metro Manila, six shipping lines based in Cebu,
three shipping associations, and the Distributors Management Association
of the Philippines (DMAP).
10The 1983 data were initially processed but the annual reports of some of the shipping
companies are missing. MARINA has data on annual total passenger and cargo traffic but
not by route and shipping company, which are needed in analyzing market structure and
competition.43 AUSTRIA
Table 2.  Classification of routes
(1) Routes with only one (1) operator
monopoly
(2) Routes with at least two (2)    operators
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Data on passenger traffic were used in measuring the market structure
for the passenger service. For cargo service, since different units of
measurement were used for cargo traffic, aggregation was impossible.11 Thus,
data on cargo revenue were used. Also, since the latest secondary data available
are those of 1998, the analysis of the study on market structure does not
reflect the possible effects of MC 153 and MC 161, which provided further




The HHI shows that the domestic shipping industry is highly concentrated
(Table 3). The five largest operators accounted for as much as 90 percent of
the total passengers. The inverse of HHI shows that out of the 37 operators
plying the primary and secondary routes, less than five are effectively
competing.
The five largest players in the passenger service, in decreasing order,
are Negros Navigation Company, WG&A, Sulpicio Lines, Philippine Fast
Ferry Corporation, and Cebu Ferries Corporation. Three of these operators
are new competitors, having been established only during the reform period.
WG&A is a product of the merger of three shipping giants (William Lines
11Units of measurements include kilogram, metric tons, and quantity.44 PHILIPPINE JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT
Inc., Carlos A. Gothong Lines, Inc. and Aboitiz Shipping Corp.) in 1996.
Philippine Fast Ferry (PFFC) is also a product of the merger in 1998 of the
Cebu-based Universal Aboitiz, Inc. and Bacolod-based Sea Angels Ferry
Corporation, a subsidiary of Negros Navigation Company. Cebu Ferries
Corporation (CFC) was established in 1996 as a subsidiary of WG&A. Both
PFFC and CFC have been pivotal to the birth of the fast ferry industry in the
country. The other two players (Negros Navigation and Sulpicio Lines) are
old players, having been established long before the reforms were introduced.
An analysis of the different routes shows that the top five players operate
most of the primary routes (Appendix Table 1). However, there is not one
route where they operate together. On the other hand, the top three
companies operate together in eight routes, all originating from Manila
(Manila-Cagayan de Oro, Manila-Cebu, Manila-Davao, Manila-Dumaguete,
Manila-General Santos, Manila-Iligan, Manila-Iloilo and Manila-Tagbilaran).
About 50 percent of the primary routes have at least two operators and
the remaining 50 percent only have one operator (Table 4 and Appendix
Table 1). Nonetheless, the presence of at least two operators in a route does
not guarantee that competition exists. Of the 26 primary routes with at least
two operators, substantial competition existed only in seven routes, or less
than 14 percent of the total number of primary routes, while five routes were
effectively monopolized, as there was only one effective competitor. The rest
of the primary routes (27 percent) can be described as having only mild
competition. A very good example of this is the Cebu-Bohol route where
there were nine operators plying the said route but less than three were
effectively competing for the passenger market. Another is the Cebu-
Dumaguete route where there were six operators but only three were
effectively competing.
For the secondary passenger routes, almost 59 percent were
monopolized; 13 percent can be characterized by substantial competition; 13
percent as having only mild competition; and 15 percent being effectively
dominated by only one competitor (Table 4 and Appendix Table 2).
Table 3.  Indicators fo market structure, passenger service, 1998
Share of top five firms 90.26
Share of top three firms 72.94
Herfindahl index (HHI) 90.210




On the other hand, monopoly was present in nearly 78 percent of the
tertiary routes (Table 4 and Appendix Table 3). Operation in about 5 percent
of the routes was effectively dominated by one operator. Substantial
competition was found in only 8 percent of the routes.
Cargo service
Figures on freight revenue also show that the industry is highly concentrated.
The five largest operators together carried 91 percent of the total revenue
(Table 5). Out of the 66 operators, less than five are effectively competing.
The five major players in the cargo service, in their order, include
WG&A, Sulpicio Lines, Lorenzo Shipping Corporation, Solid Shipping
Corporation, and Negros Navigation. Lorenzo Shipping and Solid Shipping
are purely cargo service providers. An analysis of the routes shows that there
are only three routes (Manila-Cagayan de Oro, Manila-Dumaguete and Manila-
General Santos), where the top five companies operate together.
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Table 4.  State of competition, passenger service, 1998
Routes with only 1 operator
Routes with at least 2 operators




Routes with mild competition
Total number of routes
Route Classification
Primary Secondary Tertiary


































Table 5. Indicators of market structure, cargo service, 1998
Share of top five firms 91.121
Share of top three firms 70.921
Herfindahl index (HHI) 0.217
Number of operators (n) 66.021
1/n 90.015
1/HHI 94.614
Indicator Percent46 PHILIPPINE JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT
Close to two-thirds of the primary and secondary cargo routes had at
least two operators but less than 15 percent experienced substantial
competition (Table 6 and Appendix Tables 4 & 5). On the other hand, a
greater majority (76 percent) of the tertiary routes were still monopolized
(Table 6  and Appendix Table 6).
Findings common to passenger and cargo
The dominance of the top five companies, in both passenger and cargo
services, was prevalent in the primary and secondary routes, regardless of the
routes’ state of competition (Austria 2002). In other words, they effectively
control the market in these routes. Regular monitoring of the routes then
becomes necessary to ensure that the top five players do not abuse their
market power, more so given the fact that the percentage of routes with
substantial competition is relatively small.
Substantial competition is expected in routes common to the top five
or top three players. It is surprising, however, that this is not the case. In fact,
there was only mild competition in those routes. Only in the Manila-
Dumaguete passenger route, where the top three companies operated
together, was there substantial competition.
Substantial competition is also expected in the major ports because the
supposed large passenger market and volume of cargoes will draw more
players into the routes. However, an analysis of the routes originating from
Manila or Cebu, two of the country’s major ports, shows otherwise. Most of the
routes either have only one operator or are characterized by only mild
competition (Table 7 and Table 8).
A further analysis of the individual routes shows that operators have
their own niche markets. This is true even for the five largest operators. A
Table 6. State of competition cargo service, 1998
Routes with only 1 operator
Routes with at least 2 operators




Routes with mild competition
Total number of routes
Route Classification
Primary Secondary Tertiary


































good example of this is Solid Shipping Lines that operates in only three cargo
routes (Manila-Cagayan, Manila-Dumaguete and Manila-General Santos).
An analysis of the routes with only one effective competitor or mild
competition shows that the dominant player or players get the bulk of the
market while the rest have very small share. The market shares of the dominant
player or players range from 83 percent to almost 100 percent for the routes,
with only one effective competitor and from 59 percent to almost 100 percent
for those with mild competition.12 It is possible that the dominant players
offer lower rates or they have more vessels and larger capacities enabling
them to capture a large segment of the market, leaving the remaining segment
to the rest who probably have only small capacities. Pursuing this issue,
however, is beyond the scope of this paper, since it requires an analysis of the
cost structures of the individual operators.
The high concentration in the tertiary routes for both passenger and
cargo services may not really pose a problem, since these are usually
considered “thin routes,” where traffic is insufficient to attract more than one
operator.13 That is, only one operator is required to make the operation
profitable and efficient. What is critical, however, is the close monitoring by
MARINA of the services of operators plying the said routes to make sure that
these operators do not abuse their market power to the detriment of the
passengers and shippers.
Intermodal competition
The market power in the passenger service is now constrained by competition
from other modes of transportation. In particular, the deregulation of the air
transport industry has captured part of the first- and second-class passengers.
This is particularly true during off-peak season when airlines are able to offer
budget fares that come very close to the third-class passenger rates of shipping
lines. The fast travel by air and the comfort that it provides more than
compensate for the price difference, thereby enabling airlines to capture a
sizeable chunk of the passenger market.
In addition, the budget airfares opened an alternative mode of travel to
a market that formerly cannot afford to travel by air. The best examples of
these are housemaids from the southern part of the country who are working
in Metro Manila or students from the south studying in universities in Metro
Manila. On the other hand, the introduction of fast ferries provides a good
competition to airlines flying the secondary and tertiary routes.
AUSTRIA
12An example is the Cebu-Ormoc passenger route where there were six operators. Yet 84
percent of the passenger traffic went to only two players. Another in Cebu-Bohol passenger
route with nine operators, three of whom captured 83 percent of the market.
13There is less economic activity and population in the tertiary routes, implying smaller
passenger and cargo traffic compared to the primary and secondary routes.48 PHILIPPINE JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT
Table 7. State of competition, routes originating from Manila and Cebu, passenger
services, 1998























































































Source: Appendix Tables 1 to 3.49 AUSTRIA
Table 8. State of competition, routes originating from Manila and Cebu, cargo
services, 1998
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Source: Appendix Tables 4 to 6.
Table 8. Continued










































































In addition, the development of roads and other infrastructure in the
southern part of the country opened an alternative to shipping transport.14
Land transport from Manila to the Visayas and even to Davao has become
increasingly popular to travelers because of the cheaper bus fare, providing
competition to the Manila-Tacloban, Manila-Catbalogan, or Manila-Davao
shipping routes.
Nonetheless, market power in the cargo service still lies in the hands of
the shipping industry.
Competition
Because of the absence of data, the results of the interview with shipping
lines and the executive director of the DMAP will be used in analyzing the
effects of the policy reforms on competition. The results of the interview
reveal that the most significant impact of the reforms is the increase in
competition in the industry. Given this information and the indicators of
market structure in 1998 discussed in the preceding section, it can be
deduced that the industry was more concentrated prior to 1998. The merger
of the shipping giants was initially perceived to be a threat by the other major
players. However, since shipping companies operate by maintaining niche
markets, the merger neither made the industry more concentrated nor
increased the market power of the merged companies.15 The merger in fact
promoted competition. The merger was the response of the companies
involved in increasing their efficiency as a result of competition.
However, the increase in competition is felt only in the primary and
secondary routes. This confirms the finding in the preceding section that
the majority of the tertiary routes are still run by single operators. The increase
in competition in the primary and secondary routes came from additional
operators.
The increase in the number of competitors in the routes is beneficial
to passengers and shippers because it gave them several choices of shipping
lines for the services they need. For shippers, competition did not only
increase choices for their cargoes but it also increased their linkage to their
ports of call. The immediate results of competition are the improvement in
the quality of service.
14An example of this is the construction of the Marcelo Fernan Bridge connecting Cebu City
and Lapu-lapu City that has reduced the numger of passenger plying the Lapu-lapu ferry
route, because some passengers now prefer to travel by land, considering the reduction in
traffice caused by the construction of the bridge.
15The argument is based on an interview with shipping lines. The executive director of the
DMAP thinks otherwise.52 PHILIPPINE JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT
16One shipping operator in Cebu has a ticketing and booking office that looks better than the
ticketing offices of domestic airlines.












































Notes: Data for 1996 not included. Capacity is based on passenger cargo GRT for passenger
and general cargo plus container GRT for cargo.
Sources: MARINA (for GRT); Philippine Statistical Yearbook (passenger traffic).
Quality of service
Because competition has increased, shipping operators were forced to
improve the quality of their service. Customer service and satisfaction drive
up competition, thereby improving efficiency. Improvement in the quality of
service also meant the introduction of new facilities and amenities on board,
and improvement or upgrading of facilities not only in passenger
accommodation but also in ticketing and booking facilities.16 Upgrading of
facilities encouraged certification from International Specifications
Maintenance and International Standards Organization.
Improvement and upgrading of facilities resulted in the modernization
of the domestic fleet. Bigger and better vessels were acquired. Starting in
1993, the domestic fleet, particularly passenger cargo and general cargo,
registered a big increase in tonnage such that the capacity of the industry was
growing much faster than the passenger and cargo traffic (Table 9). Then,
too, the average age of vessels for passenger cargo substantially declined
from 21 years in 1990 to less than 10 years in 1999, indicating newer vessels
plying the routes (Table 10).
However, there is also the view that the modernization of the domestic
fleet resulted in the overtonnaging of the primary routes during the early
stage of the reform process. Such situation, however, is expected as shipping
companies adjust their operations to the new environment. Likewise, the
increase in capacity during the first half of the 1990s was in anticipation of
the expected increase in passenger and cargo traffic in the future. That is,53
since vessel acquisition takes time, vessels deployed today are not meant to
address present demand only but also future capacity. However, prolonged
overtonnaging could endanger competition. There is a general observation
that most shipping companies are now reducing their fleet and consolidating
their operations. The reduction in fleet was also partly due to the fact that the
increase in demand for shipping services expected earlier did not materialize.
Improvement in facilities is best exemplified by the advent of fast craft
vessels. Dubbed as “a home right at sea,” these fast-speed craft extend the
best of services and the best of convenience enabling passengers to crisscross
islands and regions fast. The fast vessels opened a new marketing strategy in
the transportation business. Operators of such vessels have established links
with airlines and large shipping lines with operations originating from Manila,
operating in a hub-and-spoke pattern. That is, the airlines and large shipping
lines bring passengers through the primary routes while the fast vessels will
bring these same passengers to their destinations in the secondary routes.
Visayas is the hub of the country’s fast-craft operation. The strategy has
propelled commerce and trade and accelerated tourism and tourism-related
activities in the southern part of the country.
However, the profitability of the fast-craft industry is considered difficult
to sustain. It is said that fast craft are not appropriate yet for the country,
considering the country’s level of development. Fast-craft vessels generally
cater to the A-B crowd, or the high-income group of the society. However,
AUSTRIA



























































Source: MARINA Domestic Fleet Inventory54 PHILIPPINE JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT
17Vessels designed to use the RORO method of cargo handling are designed with a ramp at
the stern. Over the ramp, connected to a pier, loaded vans pass aboard, stowing themselves
under their own power. On the other hand, containerization is a method of carrying cargo in
vessel container vans stowed on deck or in the cargo hold of a ship.
domestic sea passengers in the country are mostly C-D crowd or low-income
group of society. Likewise, fast craft are good only for short travels; but then
again, most passengers in these routes are C-D crowd and a few business
people who travel to places not within the reach of air transport. It is observed
that some of the fast vessels have been pulled out from some of the routes.
For cargo services, improvement in quality means the availability of
sufficient and appropriate services. The latter was achieved through
improvement in technology in cargo services, like the use of RORO vessels
and containerization.17 However, the use of RORO vessels is more appropriate
for the country, considering its archipelagic setting. Large benefits can be
derived from RORO operations by avoiding handling at two ports, and the
time losses and value losses deriving from the time spent at ports. On the
other hand, containerization is more appropriate for long voyages, like in
international shipping.
Services in the tertiary routes, on the other hand, remain unimproved
because of the lack, if not absence, of competition. Old vessels and motorized
bancas are still utilized, endangering the lives of passengers.
Passage and freight rates
Available data on the actual rates charged by two of the major players in the
industry show that rates for both passage and cargo have increased in real
terms (Tables 11 to 14). What is striking, however, is the large increase in
rates after 1999 compared to the years before it. This is true regardless of the
class of commodity or passenger, except for the first-class passengers of WG&A.
As earlier discussed, the DOSCON was abolished in late 1999, allowing
companies full freedom to determine their deregulated rates. However, the
three automatic fuel rate adjustments in 2000, totaling 19.15 percent,
contributed to the large increase for the period 1999-2000. On the other
hand, the general rate increase of 20 percent adopted by the shipping
association in November 2000 contributed to the increase in 2000-2001. The
uniform increase for all shipping operators is alarming as it has a semblance
of a cartel-like arrangement.
Nonetheless, the deregulation has corrected what otherwise were very
low cargo rates arising from the past regulatory system. This could be seen
from the large increase (53.3 percent) in cargo rate of the Manila-Tacloban
route in 1999-2000 (Table 11). Based on an interview, the route is a classic
example of the large imbalance between inbound and outbound cargo traffic.55
Table 11. Annual increase in cargo rates, Sulpicio Lines (%, 1995 prices)













































































































































































































Source: Quarterly report on actual rates charged by shipping companies, as submitted to
the MARINA.
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Note: No data available for 1999.
Source: Quarterly report on actual rates charged by shipping companies, as submitted to
the MARINA.
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That is, a ship is full from Manila to Tacloban but not vice-versa. Hence,
before deregulation, the regulated rate for the route did not reflect the cost
of providing the shipping services. Given the abolition of the DOSCON
process, the market could have corrected the rate and have contributed to the
large increase that occurred in 2000. This argument is strengthened by the
fact that the rate increase in 2000-2001 was already small (9.1 percent).
It would have been good to examine the cargo rates for basic
commodities, which are containerized, because deregulation is expected to
increase the rates of these commodities. This is on account of the fact that
regulated rates for noncontainerized basic commodities were so low that they
were unattractive to shipping operators. However, data for rates for basic
commodities are not available.
Based on interviews with shipping companies, during off-peak season
when there is excess capacity, cutthroat competition leads to “fare diving.”
Some companies go to the extent of cutting their rates to the level that is just
enough to get a breakeven income or recover the cost of oil. This is true even
for the regulated rates because enforcement is weak. However, the worst-case
scenario is when a shipping operator practices fare diving and yet still earns
profits by overloading. Discounting of this form adversely affects competition
because it punishes operators who follow regulations. Likewise, overloading
puts the safety of passengers at risk.
Impact of Competition
Competition creates pressure on the shipping companies to produce the
quality of service desired by passengers and shippers at the least cost. In
other words, competition drives them to become efficient. Companies whose
quality of service is poor, whose costs are high or whose profit margins are
excessive, will lose their customers to their rivals and eventually be driven out
the market. Thus, only the efficient ones remain.
This section of the paper examines how competition promotes efficiency
in the industry. Ideally, efficiency would be measured in terms of the costs
and profit margins of companies. However, financial data are difficult to
obtain; and even if they may not reflect the true financial operations, because
business people maintain different books, depending on the intended use.
Thus, the analysis here deals not with efficiency per se but with  the process
by which competition promotes the level of efficiency. This is called transfer
mechanism, defined as the process whereby output is reallocated from less to
more efficient operators (Dick 1987).
The indicator used is the turnover of firms that takes into account the
entry and exit of companies arising from competition. Again, only those
plying the primary and secondary routes were considered. The shipping
companies are classified into two: (a) those established before the policy
reforms, called the “old-order” companies; and (b) those established after61
the policy reforms, called the “new-order” companies. The cutoff year is 1992,
since the liberalization of routes occurred toward the end of that year. In
addition, exit is defined as when an operator does not operate in any of the
routes (primary and secondary) for two or three consecutive years. Mergers
are considered new entrants to the industry.
Some 103 shipping companies comprised the industry during the period
1990-1998, 76 of which were established before policy reforms were instituted
and 27 during the reform period (Table 15). By the end of 1998, only 37, or
49 percent, of the old-order companies still existed. That is, 51 percent are
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Sources: MARINA Route Inventory (VIS-L-13)
MARINA Vessels with Valid Authority per Link (VIS-L3A)
MARINA List of Authorities Issued (VIS-L7)
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no longer operating, probably due to the stiff competition brought about by the
reforms, or because they have acquired new names due to merger or acquisition.
The liberalization of route entry, on the other hand, enabled 27 new
shipping companies to enter the industry during the period 1993-1998.
Nonetheless, only 16, or 59 percent, survived by the end of 1999. In
other words, 11 exited the industry, having possibly succumbed to competition.
However, despite the high survival rate of the new-order companies (59
percent as against 49 percent for the old-order companies), the surviving
companies are still dominated by the old-order ones. That is, 70 percent of
the surviving firms were established before the reforms were instituted.
Likewise, these operators control about 64 percent of the industry’s cargo
capacity and 63 percent of passenger capacity.
It is important to note that exit from the industry was highest in 1998
(15 operators) when there was financial crisis. On the other hand, entry was
highest in 1994 (11 operators).
A further analysis of the surviving companies shows that 43 percent of
them are growing in their capacity; 34 percent experienced a decline in
their capacity while the remaining 23 percent did not register any change in
their capacity since they were established (Table 16). There was also a
redistribution of capacity from among the surviving companies. The share of
the growing companies increased from 51 percent in 1990 (or when they
were established) to 86 percent by 1998. Their absolute tonnage in 1998 was
43 percent higher. On the other hand, the share of the declining companies
went down from 48 percent to 12 percent.
If competition is effective, the redistribution of capacity from declining
to growing companies should be accompanied by the redistribution of output
from the less efficient to more efficient companies. Unfortunately, whether
this in fact occurred with the surviving companies in 1998 cannot be analyzed
from the data available. For it is possible that some of the growing companies
were able to increase their capacities for reasons other than commercial
efficiency. On the other hand, it is also possible that companies experience
a decline in capacity, not because of commercial pressure but because of
marine loss. This could be an interesting area of further research to ascertain
whether the competition arising from the reforms in fact increases the level
of efficiency of the industry.
MARINA’s Role in a Deregulated and Liberalized Environment
MARINA takes charge of regulating the shipping industry. The agency’s
regulatory functions cover interisland rates, entry, and safety and service
standards.
Under a deregulated and liberalized environment, MARINA should
change the nature of how it regulates the industry so as to create the much63
needed competition and contestability in the market. This is crucial since
less competition has been realized, even after implementing policy reforms.
Instead of just responding to applications for new or expanded shipping
services, MARINA should be proactive where the unavailability of desirable
services is concerned. It should identify underdeveloped routes, or routes
where there is shortage of vessels, or routes that are not served, and then
facilitate investments for these routes by publicly inviting investors. MARINA
should allow new entrants to the tertiary routes, where there is practically no
safe, reliable, and adequate service and where, more often than not, there is
rampant overloading of passengers during peak seasons.
MARINA should also strengthen its developmental functions. Of
particular concern to the shipping industry is the Authority‘s apparent weak
monitoring capabilities. Attention to this concern becomes all the more
important since, as discussed earlier, only a small percentage of the routes
(whether primary, secondary, or tertiary) experience substantial competition
and that the top five companies of the industry dominate the routes,
regardless of the routes’ state of competition. Under the current setup (MC
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Table 16. Surviving firms, growing, and declining based on net registered tonnage
(NRT) change














































































Note: Date for nine firms are either incomplete or unavailable.
Source: MARINA Route Inventory (VIS-L-13)64 PHILIPPINE JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT
No. 153), MARINA intervenes only if passengers and shippers file a complaint
against the rates and services of shipping companies and only if sufficient
basis and justification is submitted. Such regulation should be modified.
Monitoring should be on a regular basis (and not only when complaints are
filed) to ensure that the interests of shippers and passengers are protected
against overcharging and poor service standards, and that the dominant firm
or firms in each route do not abuse their market power. Regular monitoring
would, in the first place, prevent shipping companies from making actions
contrary to the regulations.
Monitoring should be done in tandem with the Philippine Coast Guard
(PCG), which gives vessels the authority to sail. As discussed earlier, a shipping
operator can resort to fare diving or large discounts and still earn profits by
overloading its passengers. Such practice can be avoided if the PCG does
strict monitoring of the vessels.
However, for MARINA to be able to exercise its monitoring functions
effectively and for it to be able to identify routes requiring adequate shipping
services, it must establish a database that is easily accessible to the shipping
operators, investors, researchers, policymakers, and the public in general.
Current regulations require shipping companies to submit to the MARINA
quarterly reports of passenger/cargo traffic and the actual rates charged by
their vessels, whether regulated or deregulated. These reports, however, are
not being processed into a database.18
The database should include, at the very least, passenger/cargo traffic
and freight/passage rates by shipping company and by route; number of
operators per route and vessel capacity per route. The effectiveness of MARINA
as an investment facilitator and regulator on a day-to-day basis hinges much on
the availability of this critical information. MARINA therefore needs to
establish a database, complete with computer facilities and human resources.
One particular issue that has confronted MARINA since the advent of
deregulation is the basis for the approval of upward adjustment of regulated
rates. The approach currently used is still the revenue deficiency method.
However, the approach is no longer appropriate as the financial statements
of shipping companies include their deregulated operations.
Areas for competition policy and further reforms
Liberalization and deregulation should not be undertaken in isolation. The
policy reforms should be complemented by competition policy to ensure
that the competition and other benefits arising from liberalization and
18Based on the author’s experience in doing this study. No data on freight/passage rates or
passenger/cargo traffic by routes and by company are readily available.65
deregulation are not eroded by possible development of market power among
shipping lines. This is important, as substantial competition exists in only a
small percentage of the routes and that cartel-like arrangements have been
observed to exist in the industry.
One area for competition policy is merger and acquisition or
consolidation. Fierce competition can push companies into bankruptcy, or
merger and consolidation. The latter can have both positive and negative
effects. On the positive side, efficiency could be enhanced as mergers allow
shipping companies to consolidate their functions like marketing, ticketing,
repair and maintenance, etc. On the negative side, there is the fear that the
end result will be a large company becoming so dominant that it can exert
considerable market power.
The country’s shipping industry has seen mergers and consolidations
taking place in response to the reforms. This situation, however, has yet to
result in an increase in market power of the merged companies, which are
primarily more concerned about consolidating their functions instead of
increasing their market share. The picture could change, however, once the
consolidation process has been completed.
Hence, a policy on merger and consolidation should be defined in
such a way that mergers and consolidations would not result in reduced
service and less competition. The efficiency effects should be weighed against
market power effects. In short, mergers should be undertaken with the best
interests of the riding public.
Another important area to consider is the development of tertiary routes.
The shipping industry has become an important source of competition for
the air transport industry in providing transport services in the country’s
islands for the south (Austria 2002). The system of providing government
incentives to shipping operators developing the tertiary routes should
therefore be designed in such a way that the efficiency arising from the
intermodal competition will not be distorted.
More reforms
The government should continue its deregulation efforts. Of particular
interest is the regulated rate for the second-class for non-DOT-accredited
vessels that either offer only first-and second-class accommodation, or whose
third-class accommodation is less than 50 percent of the total passenger
capacity. This regulation has no rationale, as the first- and second-class
passenger services have already been deregulated.
One important area awaiting deregulation is the third-class passenger
service. About 70 percent of passengers take the third-class service, the majority
of whom also come from the C-D crowd. The regulated rate for this service is
regarded by shipping companies as very low and cannot cover cost. The
operation is therefore cross-subsidized, often by cargo revenue. Since most of
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the cargo rates are already deregulated, passenger-cargo vessels are placed at
a disadvantage against pure cargo vessels, because cross-subsidization is no
longer feasible under a deregulated environment. This is also aggravated by
the fact that current regulation requires passenger vessels to allocate 50
percent of their passenger capacity to third-class passengers, except for DOT-
accredited vessels. Given the sensitivity of the issue because of its social
implications, any attempt to deregulate the third-class passenger service
should be carefully looked into. A balance should be struck between social
objectives and economic efficiency.
Two other significant areas of reform are the ceiling on the return on
investment and the application of the revenue deficiency method for upward
adjustment of regulated rates. Both are anti-competitive. The ceiling on ROI
serves as a disincentive for efficient shipping companies because the return
may not be commensurate with the level of service rendered. Based on the
results of the interview, many of the shipping companies have regarded
shipping as less profitable than other competing investments. The ceiling
on ROI makes the industry less attractive to investors.
On the other hand, the revenue deficiency method awards inefficient
companies because it guarantees return, regardless of the level of efficiency.
As presented earlier, the method can no longer be applied under the new
environment because the financial statements of companies also include
their deregulated operations.
Summary and conclusion
This paper has examined the effects of liberalization and deregulation in
the shipping industry on competition and market structure. The study shows
that the policy reforms have improved competition, undermining industry
practices leading to an improvement in the quality of service. The reforms
provided new operators with the opportunity to gain entry in routes where
entry was previously restricted by the “grandfather rules.”
Nonetheless, substantial competition exists in only a small percentage
of the routes. A greater majority of the routes are still effectively monopolized,
or experienced only mild competition. The top three or five companies in
the industry effectively dominate the different routes. What is more striking
is the large increase in cargo and passenger rates after the implementation
of the reforms. The cartel-like arrangement that is observed to exist in the
industry may have contributed to this.
The policy reform has been a slow process and much is still desired.
There is a need for competition policy to ensure that the benefits derived
from liberalization and deregulation will not be eroded by the possible abuse
of market power among the shipping lines. Likewise, the commercial success
or failure of shipping companies in a liberalized and deregulated67
environment hinges much on their responsiveness to market requirements;
in short, their competitiveness. However, competitiveness depends on a host
of factors that include shipping costs and physical and administrative
infrastructure. It has always been argued that domestic shipping costs (fuel,
interest rate, insurance, and income and freight taxes) and handling costs
in the country are higher than those of other countries in the region
(Lorenzo 1997; PISA 2001). On the other hand, port facilities in the
country are far below world-class standards, with some ports still
undeveloped.
Finally, the high domestic shipping cost is creating pressure to lift the
cabotage law to enable domestic shippers to avail themselves of lower shipping
costs from foreign vessels. Scrapping this law will expose interisland shipping
to the pressures of international competition. This would then be
advantageous to the country in the long run, as it will force all local industry
players to increase their efficiency to survive the competition. However, the
government needs to identify the measures and actions that need to be
undertaken, including their sequencing, during the transition to full
liberalization to prepare domestic shipping lines for global competition. At
the very least, the domestic shipping environment should be improved by
addressing the issues affecting its competitiveness.
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